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Xhe Greater Cleveland community
was informed on March 9, 1990, that
the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency had moved to close First Bank
National Association, the fourth
minority-owned financial institution to
fail in the Fourth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict in the last three years. Currently,
only one minority-controlled bank
remains operating in the Fourth District.
The total number of minority-owned
banks nationwide has remained steady
during the past seven years, as the num-
ber of new entrants and banks gaining
minority status has almost kept pace
with the quantity of banks that have
failed, merged, or lost minority status
after a change in ownership.
Minority-owned banks have been
operating in this country since 1866,
and their performance characteristics
have been the subject of numerous
studies. In general, results indicate that
minority-owned banks differ from
other banks in many important
respects, not the least of which is bank
profitability. Compared with their
peers, minority-owned banks have
generated weaker profits, on average,
for a considerable period. This continu-
ing record of poor profitability sug-
gests that many of these institutions are
indeed still struggling for survival.
This Economic Commentary discus-
ses the current health of minority bank-
ing in the United States by highlighting
selected balance-sheet items for both
minority- and nonminority-owned peer
banks. These items are then interpreted
against the background of previous re-
search studies on minority banks. The
most important implication is that
minority-owned banks, because they
are essentially "niche institutions,"
operate with different marketing plans,
personnel, and customers than do non-
minority banks of comparable size.
• Identification and Classification
of Minority Banks
Minority institutions experienced sig-
nificant growth during the 1970s—
growth that was assisted, in part, by
social legislation. During 1969 and
1971, President Nixon signed Executive
Orders #11458 and #11625, which were
designed to develop a program to
strengthen minority business. As a
result of these directives, the Commerce
and Treasury Departments established
the Minority Bank Development Pro-
gram (MBDP).' The MBDP publishes
a roster of minority banks that is dis-
tributed to public and private organ-
izations to encourage use of minority-
bank services. Whether a bank
participates in the MBDP is a common
standard used to gauge its ownership
status as a minority institution.
For purposes of eligibility, a minority-
owned institution is classified as any
The minority banking industry,
which experienced significant growth
during the 1970s, remained strong
through the 1980s, with a 71-percent
increase in total assets between 1983
and 1989. But hidden in that figure is
a dynamic process of growth and
change resulting not only from
minority banks' efforts to adjust to
deregulation, adverse macro-
economic conditions, and increased
competition—factors with which all
U.S. banks must deal—but also from
their efforts to deal with the specific
environmental factors and risks that
they alone face.
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of the following groups: black
American, native American, Hispanic-
American, Asian-American, Eskimo,
Aleut, multiracial, or women. The
diversity of ownership is worth noting,
because some researchers think that
bank performance varies with the iden-
tity of the controlling group.
According to Treasury officials,
approximately 150 U.S. financial
institutions are minority owned or con-
trolled and therefore eligible for the
MBDP program. Government agencies
such as the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS), and the
Department of Defense are encouraged
to place federal and other Treasury-
collected funds into minority institu-
tions. HUD and its grantees and
recipients have provided $125 million
to $140 million annually in deposits to
qualifying institutions.
Minority-owned institutions are also
currently receiving deposits of about
$35 million annually through the
Department of Energy (DOE), which
has established escrow accounts to
hold fines assessed against energy-
related companies for alleged viola-
tions of federal laws and regulations.
The DOE's program is in the process
of being expanded.
In addition to the adoption of social
legislation designed to aid all minority
banks, government assistance beyond
the apparent norm has also been given
at times. Irvine H. Sprague, in his book
Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank
Failures and Rescues, describes how
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) utilized the "essentiality
doctrine" for the first time during
1971. A provision of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act—informally
called the essentiality doctrine—gives
the FDIC's board of directors the
authority to prevent a bank from failing
if its services are regarded as essential
to its community.
The FDIC first used this power to
prevent Unity Bank of Boston from
failing at any cost, because its services
were determined to be essential to the
community. In this case, "community"
was defined as the black community
that relied on the bank's services. The
essentiality doctrine was also used in
1972 to assist the Bank of the Com-
monwealth in Detroit. More recently,
a combined effort by the National
Bankers Association, state regulators,
and the FDIC enabled the successful
recapitalization of a failed minority
bank in Seattle, while allowing it to
retain its minority ownership.
Not surprisingly, minority-owned banks
tend to be located where minority-
group populations are large. Assets of
most minority institutions are concen-
trated primarily in just three Federal
Reserve Districts: San Francisco, Dal-
las, and Atlanta. These three areas
account for 53 percent of all minority-
owned banks and 63 percent of the
assets held by such banks. Asian-
American-owned institutions are
located primarily in southern California,
while the majority of Hispanic-
American banks are located in southern
Texas. The assets of black-owned insti-
tutions are found primarily in the
Chicago, Richmond, and Atlanta
Federal Reserve Districts, which collec-
tively house 61 percent of black-owned
banks and 68 percent of black-owned-
bank assets.
• Recent History of Bank
Performance
During the 1980s, the financial indus-
try began to face deregulation, adverse
macroeconomic conditions, and
increased competition. Many changes
in legislation and regulation were
passed with the intention of "leveling
the playing field" for all financial
institutions. However, the overall quan-
tity of minority banks remained steady.
In 1983, 105 minority banks existed;
by the third quarter of 1989, that num-
ber had declined only to 103, a 2-
percent decrease. Within each owner-
ship group, however, the growth in
number, as well as in assets, has varied.
For example, during this seven-year
period, the number of Asian-American
and Hispanic-American banks
increased 71 percent and 21 percent,
respectively, while the number of black-
owned banks declined 22 percent. By
comparison, the total number of
insured banks in the United States
declined 12 percent (from 16,112 to
14,108) over the same period.
Despite a slight decline in the number
of minority banks, their aggregate
assets reflected strong growth from
1983 to 1989, increasing from $5.18
billion to $8.85 billion, or 71 percent.
Hispanic-American institutions
enjoyed the largest asset growth—$2.3
billion, or a 116-percent increase.
During the same period, asset growth
of black-owned banks increased only
$231 million, or 14 percent. By com-
parison, the aggregate assets of all
insured banks grew 38 percent, from
$2.49 trillion to $3.43 trillion.
• Measuring and Comparing
Performance
Factors contributing to the success of
minority-owned banks are the same as
those for any banking institution: (1)
banks must target specific community
needs and service them, (2) the direc-
tors and management must work
together toward achieving common
goals and objectives, (3) prudent levels
of risk should be taken, and (4) opera-
tions should be run efficiently. But
because there appear to be fundamental
distinctions between the balance-sheet
profiles of minority and nonminority
banks, strategies implemented by their
respective directorate and management
teams may need to vary with the type of
institution.
Previous research on the operations
and performance of minority-owned
banks indicates that, compared with
nonminority banks, these banks tend to
rely more heavily on government
deposits.
7 As a consequence, minority
banks also hold fewer loans and more
liquid assets. The loan portfolio itself
has traditionally shown a strong reli-
ance on real estate, while commercial
loans have been underrepresented.
Studies have also found that these
banks have a more labor-intensive
production process, possibly becauseTABLE 1 BALANCE-SHEET COMPARISONS
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SOURCE: Consolidated Report of Condition, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 30, 1989.
their depositors tend to keep accounts
with small balances and high activity
levels. Current data suggest that
most of these previous research find-
ings remain valid.
The distinction regarding government
deposits still exists: Last year, the
average minority bank relied more
heavily on deposits originating from
the federal government than did non-
minority banks. Such deposits as a per-
centage of total liabilities are several
hundred basis points greater for the
average minority bank than for its non-
minority peer (table 1, line 8)." The
average minority bank also holds be-
tween 9 and 54 percent more in
deposits from the state government
(line 9). Reliance on government-
generated deposits is probably due to
the MBDP.
Compared with its nonminority peer
group, the typical minority bank with
assets of less than $50 million has a
slightly greater percentage of its assets
tied up in loans, whereas the average
minority bank with assets of more than
$50 million holds a slightly lower per-
centage in loans. The distribution of
these loans by type (for example, com-
mercial, consumer, and real estate) is
also quite different when comparing
the loan portfolios of minority and non-
minority institutions. One example is
that the average minority bank general-
ly holds 40 to 50 percent more commer-
cial loans as a percentage of total assets
(line 3).
Although data presented in table 1 are
a snapshot of the industry as of June
1989, it does appear that minority-
owned banks may have, over time, in-
creased their holdings of commercial
loans while decreasing their holdings
of real estate loans. This may signal a
shift in the primary mission of
minority-owned banks from making
loans to individual consumers to con-
centrating on business loans.
The liquidity profile of the average
minority institution still differs from
that of its nonminority peer group. The
former owns fewer securities as a
percentage of total assets (line 5) than
does the latter. The average minority
bank also continues to hold more of its
assets in federal funds sold than does
the average nonminority bank (line 6).
Federal funds are highly liquid, but the
rate of return is likely to be lower than
that of longer-term securities. Bates
and Bradford found that because the
demand deposit accounts of black-
owned banks are more variable than
those of nonminority banks, suchbanks must hold a higher percentage of
assets in liquid form (such as govern-
ment securities and federal funds sold)
to be able to meet withdrawals.12
Minority banks also exhibit varying
degrees of performance success as
measured by return on assets (ROA)
and return on equity (ROE)—lines 11
and 12, respectively. The average
minority bank with assets of less than
$50 million generated lower ROAs and
ROEs than did the average non-
minority bank of comparable size.
Note that ROEs may vary considerably
by ownership type. One study suggests
that profitability problems of minority
banks can largely be attributed to black-
owned institutions. However, as a
minority bank's assets increase, perfor-
mance measures become more
favorable and more similar to non-
minority-bank averages. The average
minority bank with assets of more than
$50 million earns about the same ROE
as does the average nonminority bank
of similar size.
The ROE results can be explained, in
part, by differences in capital levels.
Capitalization (line 10) is important be-
cause it is the buffer that allows banks
to remain viable in the face of unex-
pected loan losses. With the advent of
risk-based capital guidelines, it is
believed that banks with riskier asset
mixes should possess higher levels of
capital than should banks with higher-
quality assets. Considering that the
average minority bank has a higher
ratio of loss provision to total loans
(line 13), indicating a weaker or riskier
loan portfolio, it should have a higher
level of capital. Unfortunately, the
average minority bank is more thinly
capitalized than its nonminority peer.
Current data indicate that operating-cost
differences among institutions remain
notable. One proxy for measuring the
efficiency of a bank's operations is its
ratio of employees to assets (line 14).
Although the average minority bank
tends to have more employees per mil-
lion dollars of assets than do non-
minority banks, it becomes more effi-
cient and more closely resembles its
nonminority peer as its assets increase.
Minority-owned banks may also benefit
from reducing expenses related to bank
premises, state and local obligations,
and real estate and commercial loans.
• Black-Owned Banks
The earliest research studies of
minority-owned banks implicitly
focused on black-owned banks because
they represented most of the assets con-
trolled by minority-owned institutions
at the time. As mentioned previously,
the ownership mix of minority banks
has become more diverse. Neverthe-
less, black-owned banks remain a sub-
ject of interest in their own right, espe-
cially in areas with large black
populations. The recent closing of
another black-owned bank in the
Fourth Federal Reserve District has
caused some to question the long-term
prospects of these banks.
Although black-owned banks do have
a slightly lower ROA than do all banks
collectively, a study by Robert T. Clair
submits that their long-run viability is
unthreatened. Clair's results show
that loan losses and operating expenses
are no higher at black-owned banks
than at nonminority banks operating in
the same specific neighborhoods. This
suggests that the lower ROAs of black-
owned banks are due to the location of
the bank, not to ownership or manage-
ment. Another study finds that minority
bank presidents are well educated, pos-
sess a broad range of banking experi-
ence, and can be expected to contribute
positively to bank performance. This
finding is significant, because several
previous studies reported that experi-
enced managers were in short supply at
minority-owned banks.
• Conclusion
Smaller minority banks, on average, are
less profitable than nonminority banks
of similar size, primarily due to a vari-
ety of market-area weaknesses. As a
counterbalance, various government
programs have been designed to
increase the services demanded of
minority institutions, but despite this
assistance, some are still struggling.
Deregulation, the increased competitive
environment, and other market forces
are pressuring all banks to focus on seg-
ments of their potential customer base
and on specific products.
During this period of upheaval and con-
solidation in the banking business, it
appears to be especially important that
minority-owned banks target specific
community needs, define an exact mis-
sion, retain strong management, risk
capital prudently, and establish proper
controls. With recognition of the
peculiar risks and environmental factors
they face, it seems likely that small
minority banks can remain viable and
can continue to contribute to the
economic progress of their communities.
To the extent that bank location
accounts for performance problems,
especially for black-owned banks, one
strategy may be to broaden the geo-
graphic market of the institution.
Otherwise, managers may need to run
their banks even more conservatively,
given their thinner capitalization,
greater loan-loss provisions, and higher
cost structures. Relying on stringent un-
derwriting guidelines may conflict with
these banks' missions to provide
greater banking resources to the com-
munities that they serve. But manage-
ment teams at the weaker minority
banks may have to forgo short-term
goals for profit and growth in order to
ensure another implicit longer-term
goal: continued viability of the bank.• Footnotes
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